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NOTES
Maritime Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Emery Air Freight Corp.
In a recent decision, Maritime Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Emery Air Freight
Corp.,I the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that an air carrier transporting cargo internationally is subject
to full liability for the loss or damage of cargo, if the carrier fails to
comply completely with international documentary requirements.
The decision, which required interpretation of the Warsaw Conven-
tion 2 [hereinafter the Convention or the Treaty], rejected the argu-
ment that certain information, though formally required by the
Convention to be listed on an air waybill,3 need not be listed if the
information is commercially insignificant and causes no prejudice to
the shipper of the goods. The opinion reflects the continuing trend
towards a more literal interpretation of the Convention's provisions
regarding air cargo transportation and away from the "purpose-ori-
ented" approach which traditionally has guided judges in their con-
struction of the Treaty.
This Note analyzes the Maritime decision's interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention's documentary requirements for international
air cargo carriers. Part I of the Note examines the factual and legal
background of the Maritime decision. Part II discusses the history
I No. 92-7672, 1993 WL 4963 at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 1993).
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [herein-
after Warsaw Convention]. The original text of the Convention was written in French.
The French text controls in any dispute concerning the proper interpretation of the Con-
vention. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 1493 (1991). Official transla-
tions of the Treaty were written in Spanish and English. In addition, an unofficial
American translation of the Treaty exists. Generally, the official and unofficial translations
of the Warsaw Convention remain true to the original French text. Therefore, for pur-
poses of simplicity, this Note cites to the official English translation of the Treaty. How-
ever, ambiguities in the original French text and discrepancies among the various
translations and the original text have caused some serious interpretative problems. See
infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguities of Article 8(h) and
(i)). When discussing these provisions, the Note will provide the original French text, the
official English translation, and the unofficial American translation of these provisions.
3 A waybill is a "written document made out by [a] carrier listing point of origin and
destination, consignor and consignee, and describing goods included in shipment . ..
Such constitutes the written description of the shipment in the event of any claim."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1593 (6th ed. 1990).
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and scope of the Warsaw Convention. Part III describes the two dif-
ferent interpretative approaches that courts have taken toward the
Convention and describes the cases which have developed these
competing jurisprudential philosophies. Part IV evaluates and criti-
ques the Maritime decision. Finally, the Note concludes that,
although the Second Circuit's holding is jurisprudentially correct
and properly construes the Convention, the decision serves no com-
mercial or legal purpose. Attributing the inequitable result of the
case to the archaic requirements of the Convention, the Note asserts
that the Maritime decision illustrates the need for the United States to
rethink its continued participation in the Warsaw Convention.
I. Maritime Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Emery Air Freight Corp.
A. Factual Background
On October 28, 1988, Continent-Wide Enterprises, Ltd. (Conti-
nent-Wide) delivered $58,220 worth of photographic equipment to
the offices of Emery Air Freight Corporation (Emery) in Panama. 4
On the same day, Emery issued an air waybill which acknowledged
the receipt of the equipment in good condition and which stated that
the Warsaw Convention governed the carriage. 5 Under the terms of
the waybill, Emery agreed to transport the equipment by air to Con-
tinent-Wide's offices in Toronto. 6 Emery routed the equipment
through Miami and contracted with Pan Am Airlines to perform the
first leg of the carriage.7 The goods, however, were mislaid or misdi-
rected en route, and Continent-Wide never received its photo-
graphic equipment.8
A timely claim for the full value of the lost equipment was
presented to Emery by Maritime Insurance Company Ltd. (Mari-
time), which was Continent-Wide's insurer and subrogee.9 Emery,
claiming that its liability was limited under the Convention, rejected
Maritime's claim and countered with a settlement offer of $4,435.23
based on the weight of the lost goods.10 Maritime refused Emery's
settlement, contending that Emery was not entitled to limited liabil-
ity under the Convention because Emery omitted some of the re-
quired particulars on its waybill.'I Specifically, Maritime noted that
the waybills did not list the place and date of the execution of the
4 No. 92-7672, 1993 WL 4963 at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 1993).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22). For a discussion of Article 22
of the Convention, see infra notes 21, 53-55 and accompanying text.
11 1993 WL 4963 at *1 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8, 9). For a
discussion of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention, see infra notes 56-72 and accompanying
text.
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waybill, the stopping place, the name of the first carrier, and the vol-
ume and dimensions of the goods, as required by Article 8(a), (c),
(e), and (i), respectively. 12
B. The District Court Opinion
Maritime filed suit against Emery' 3 in United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York for the full value of the
lost equipment.' 4 Soon thereafter, Maritime moved for summary
judgment.15
The district court denied Maritime's motion. In its opinion, the
court first considered whether the waybill's omission of the dimen-
sions and volume of the cargo constituted a violation of Article 8(i)
so as to preclude Emery from claiming limitation of liability under
the Convention.' 6 The district court held that a Second Circuit pre-
cedent, Exim Industries v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., '7 controlled
the resolution of the case. In Exim, a carrier that had omitted the
volume and dimensions of its cargo on its waybill was found never-
theless to be entitled to the Convention's limitation of liability.'
8
Adhering to precedent, the court concluded that the waybill's omis-
sion of the volume and dimensions of Continental's equipment was
"technical and insubstantial" and did not prejudice the shipper.' 9
Therefore, the district court held that the waybill's omissions did not
preclude limitation of Emery's liability. 20
Next, the court considered whether the omission of the date and
place of the waybill's execution, the intermediate stopping places,
and the name of the carrier violated Article 8 and barred Emery, as
consignee of the goods, from claiming the limitation of liability pro-
vided in Article 22 of the Convention. 2' Unlike Exim, which only in-
volved the interpretation of subsections (h) and (i) of Article 8,22 the
issue presented in Maritime required the district court to interpret the
language of subsections (a), (c), (e), and (i). Maritime argued that
Exim's "commercially significant omission" analysis was not the
12 1993 WL 4963 at * 1 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(a), (c), (e), (i)).
For a discussion of these subdivisions, see infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
13 1993 WL 4963 at * 1. Emery filed a third-party complaint against Pan Am, but the
complaint was dismissed after Pan Am filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Id. n.1.
14 Maritime Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 769 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), rev d, No. 92-7672, 1993 WL 4963 at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 1993).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 754 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the Exim decision, see infra notes
95-103 and accompanying text.
18 Id.
19 Maritime, 769 F. Supp. at 128 (citing Exim, 754 F.2d at 108).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 129.
22 754 F.2d at 106. For a discussion of subsections (h) and (i) of Article 8 of the
Warsaw Convention, see infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
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proper method of interpreting subsections (a), (c), and (e) of Article
8, which, unlike subsections (h) and (i) of that same article, were
clear and unambiguous. 23 Rather, Maritime contended that recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals required the court to construe strictly the War-
saw Convention and to read subsections (a), (c), and (e) literally.2 4
Despite the novelty of the issue and Maritime's references to recent
precedents, the district court nevertheless found Exim to be control-
ling and employed that case's "commercially significant omission"
test to analyze Maritime's claim.2 5 Accordingly, the district court de-
nied Maritime's motion for summary judgment on this issue, con-
cluding that material questions of fact remained as to whether the
shipper, Continent-Wide, was prejudiced by the omission of these
other particulars. 26
C. The Decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Maritime appealed the denial of summary judgment, asserting
that the court erred in requiring Maritime to demonstrate that the
omissions from the waybill were "commercially significant."'2 7 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Maritime's argument
and reversed the lower court's decision.28 The court of appeals,
while acknowledging the continuing validity of the Exim decision,
held that Exim should be limited to its facts and that the "commer-
cially significant omission" test was inapplicable to the case at bar. 29
The appellate court distinguished Exim from Maritime by empha-
sizing that the subsections at issue in Exim-Articles 8(h) and (i)-
were ambiguous and subject to various interpretations, while Mari-
time involved Article 8(a), (c), and (e), which were clearly and unam-
biguously written. 30 Citing the recent United States Supreme Court
opinion of Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 31 the Second Circuit stated that
its role was to construe the treaty strictly as written and not to insert
amendments into the document. 32 Applying a strict, literal construc-
tion of the Convention, the appellate court concluded that, because
Emery failed to list all of the required particulars and because Article
23 Maritime Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 769 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), rev'd, No. 92-7672, 1993 WL 4963 (2nd Cir. Jan. 13, 1993).
24 Maritime, 769 F. Supp. at 129-30 (citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S.
122 (1989); Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990); Victoria Sales
Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990)).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 No. 92-7672, 1993 WL 4963 at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 1993).
28 Id.
29 Id. at *2.
30 Id.
31 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989). For a discussion of the Chan deci-
sion, see infra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
32 Maritime, No. 92-7672, 1993 WL 4963 at *2 (citing Chan, 490 U.S. at 134).
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9 prohibits carriers from limiting their liability if Article 8's particu-
lars are absent from the waybill, Maritime was clearly entitled to
summary judgment.33
II. The Warsaw Convention
A. The History of the Convention
In 1925 and 1929, diplomats from around the world convened
in Paris and Warsaw to address the legal problems confronting the
incipient international air transportation industry.3 4 From these
meetings arose the Warsaw Convention of 1929,35 a multilateral
treaty intended to govern the international air carriage of passen-
gers, baggage, and cargo. 36 The Convention went into effect in
1932, but the United States, which did not participate in the Treaty's
drafting, did not become a signatory until 1934.3 7
The Warsaw Convention regulates international air transporta-
tion in two general ways. First, the Convention establishes interna-
tionally uniform rules providing the rights and liabilities of
international air passengers and carriers.3 8 Included in the Conven-
tion are standards for documents such as air waybills, tickets, and
baggage claim checks.3 9 Second, the Treaty establishes liability limi-
tations for air carriers transporting passengers, baggage, or cargo. 40
The drafters adopted these limitations fearing that unrestricted dam-
ages claims would deter capital investment and irreparably cripple
the fledgling air transportation industry. 4'
Critics assailed the Convention's liability limitations, contending
that the caps were intolerably low, especially with respect to claims
by injured passengers.42 Such criticism sparked various attempts to
33 Id. at *3.
34 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967).
35 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, 49 Stat. at 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. at 11.
36 For a discussion of these proceedings, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
34, at 498-99; Thomas A. Adelson, Note, Torts: Liability Limitations under the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 939, 941-42 (1991); Barbara A. Bell, Note, Torts: International
Liability Limitation Agreement, 53J. AIR L. & CoM. 839, 843-45 (1988);James K. Noble III,
Recent Development, Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention: Supreme Court Adopts a Purpose Ap-
proach to Enforce an Anachronistic Convention System, 7 FORIHAM INT'L L.J. 592, 593-94 (1984).
37 Lowenfeld & Mendelson, supra note 34, at 501-02.
38 Id. at 498-99.
39 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 8, 49 Stat. at 3016, 137 L.N.T.S. at 19 (air
waybill requirements); Id., art. 3, 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15, 17 (passenger ticket
requirements); id., art. 4, 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 17 (baggage check
requirements).
40 Id., art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23 (liability limitation for passenger
injuries or deaths); id., art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25 (liability limitation for
loss or damage of baggage or cargo). See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 34, at 499-
500 (discussing the liability limitations).
41 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 34, at 499.
42 Id. at 504.
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amend the Treaty. In 1955, international leaders met and drafted
the Hague Protocol, 43 which proposed doubling the amount recov-
erable by injured passengers, among other amendments to the Con-
vention.44 While numerous countries ratified the Hague Protocol,
the United States did not, finding the increased liability limitations
still inadequate.45 This dissatisfaction led to American denunciation
of the Warsaw Convention in 1965.46 In response, air carriers inde-
pendently agreed to increase the liability limitations under the War-
saw Convention and to assume strict liability for passenger injuries.
This agreement, known as the Montreal Agreement, 47 resulted in a
retraction of the United States' denunciation of the Convention.48
Several other attempts to reform the Warsaw Convention, such as
the Guatamala Protocol 49 and the Montreal Protocols of 1975,50
were also rejected out of hand by the United States. 5 1 Consequently,
only the original Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement
are binding law in the United States. 52
B. The Convention's Regulation of Air Cargo
The key provisions of the Warsaw Convention governing the in-
ternational transportation of air cargo are contained in Articles 8, 9,
18, and 22. 53 Under the Convention, an air carrier is presumed lia-
43 Protocol Amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [here-
inafter Hague Protocol of 1955].
44 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 34, at 507.
45 Id. at 509.
46 Id. at 546-52; Bell, supra note 36, at 848, 848 n.57 (citing U.S. Gives Notice of Denun-
ciation of Warsaw Convention, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923 (1965)).
47 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, Agreement C.A.B. 18,900, I.A.T.A. Agreement Re: Liability Limitations,
44 C.A.B. 819, reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
48 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 34, at 596.
49 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, opened for signature March 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613 [hereinafter
Guatemala Protocol].
50 The Montreal Protocols are two related protocols which incorporate all prior
amendments to the Convention. Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975,
Int'l Civ. Av. Org. Doc. No. 9147 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 3]. Additional Proto-
col No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Inter-
national Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, Int'l Civ. Av. Org. Doc. No. 9148 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol No. 4].
51 Bell, supra note 36, at 849-50. Last year Congress again considered whether the
United States should adopt the Montreal Protocols. See 138 CONG. REC. S17843-02,
S17845-02 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992). Despite the Bush Administration's calls for adopting
the Montreal Protocols, Congress tabled consideration of the matter. Id.
52 Bell, supra note 36, at 850-51.
53 These provisions also govern the transportation of checked baggage; however, this
Note does not specifically discuss the judiciary's treatment of checked baggage under the
Warsaw Convention. For a discussion of the general issues involved in checked baggage
cases, see Stephen C. Fulton, Airline Baggage Claims: A Tour Through the Legal Minefield, 5 FLA.
INT'L L.J. 349, 356-369 (1990).
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ble for the loss or damage of cargo;54 however, liability is limited to
$20 per kilogram of lost goods unless the consignor specifically de-
clares, at the time it tenders the goods to the carrier, the value of the
goods and pays a supplementary fee. 55 An air carrier, however, is
not entitled to avail itself of the liability limitations if the carrier ac-
cepts goods without making out an air waybill or if the carrier does
not list all of the information required by the Convention on the air
waybill. 56
Article 8 of the Convention requires an air waybill to contain the
following particulars: the place and date of the airbill's execution
(Article 8(a)); the place of departure and destination (Article 8(b));
the agreed stopping places (Article 8(c)); the names and addresses of
the consignor, the first carrier, and the consignee (Article 8(d), (e),
and (f), respectively); the nature of the goods (Article 8(g)); the
number of packages, the method of packing, and particular marks or
numbers upon the packages (Article 8(h)); the weight, quantity, vol-
ume, or dimensions of the goods (Article 8(i)); and a statement that
the transportation is governed by the Convention (Article 8(q)). 57 If
the air waybill omits these required particulars, then, under the
terms of the Convention, the carrier is subject to full liability.
Both commentators and judges have criticized the documentary
requirements of Article 8 on several grounds. A common target of
criticism is the unclear language of subsections (h) and (i) of Article
8.58 These ambiguities are attributable both to the imprecise draft-
54 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18, 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23, 25.
Article 18(1) reads:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruc-
tion or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the
occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the
transportation by air.
Id., art. 18(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
55 Id., art. 22(2), 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25. Article 22(2) reads as follows:
In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the
carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the con-
signor has made, at the time when the package was handed over to the car-
rier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a
supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case the carrier will be
liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that the
sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
Id. Converted into U.S. dollars, the liability limitation is $20 per kilogram, or $9.07 per
pound. See, e.g., Distribuidora Dimsa v. Linea Aerea Del Cobre S.A., 976 F.2d 90, 94 (2d
Cir. 1992) (stating the liability limit in U.S. currency).
56 Id., art. 9, 49 Stat. at 3017, 137 L.N.T.S. at 21. Article 9 reads:
If the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill having been made out, or if
the air waybill does not contain all the particulars set out in article 8 (a) to (i),
inclusive, and (q), the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the pro-
visions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Id.
57 Id., art. 8, 49 Stat. at 3016-17, 137 L.N.T.S. at 19.
58 See, e.g., Distribuidora Dimsa v. Linea Aerea Del Cobre S.A., 976 F.2d 90, 96 (2d
Cir. 1992); Exim Indus., Inc. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 754 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1986) (both
cases holding that subsections (h) and (i) are ambiguously drafted).
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ing of the original drafters and to the loose translation of the Con-
vention by several countries. With respect to subsection (h), the
original French text stated that the waybill must contain "le nombre
(the number), le mode d'emballage (the method of packing), les mar-
ques particulieres (the particular marks) ou les numeros des colis (or
the number of packages)." ' 59 The official British and unofficial
American translations, however, adopt a slight but significant varia-
tion from the French text. These translations read: "The number of
packages, the method of packing, and the particular marks or num-
bers upon them."' 60 This discrepancy has created confusion as to
whether Article 8(h) requires the listing on the waybill of only one of
the four particulars specified in the subsection or whether it requires
the recording of three of the four particulars (the number, the
method of packing, and either the particular marks or numbers of
packages). 61 Similar ambiguity clouds the interpretation of subsec-
tion (i). The original French text62 of the Convention can be read to
require the inclusion on the waybill of three of the four particulars,63
the listing of only one of the four particulars, 64 or the recordation of
only those "commercially significant" particulars in Article 8(i).65
Critics of the Warsaw Convention also argue that Article 8 and
the entire regulatory scheme of the Treaty are anachronistic and ill-
suited to govern modern air transportation. 66 Noting the radical
changes and developments in the international air industry from the
time of the Convention's drafting to today, commentators acknowl-
59 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(h), 49 Stat. at 3003, 137 L.N.T.S. at 19
(original French text of Treaty).
60 Id., art. 8(h), 49 Stat. at 3016, 137 L.N.T.S. at 19 (official British translation) (em-
phasis added); 49 U.S.C. app. s, 1502 note (American translation) (emphasis added).
While the original French text separates the second and third particulars with a comma,
the official British and unofficial American translations of Article 8(h) insert the word
"and" after the second comma.
61 See, e.g., Distribuidora Dimsa, 976 F.2d at 96-97 (containing an excellent discussion of
the debate regarding whether to read subsection (h) disjunctively or conjunctively).
62 The original French text of Article 8(i) reads as follows: "(i) Le poids, la quantiti6,
le volume ou les dimensions de la marchandise .... Warsaw Convention, supra note 2,
art. 8(h), 49 Stat. at 3003, 137 L.N.T.S. at 18. Literally translated into English, the subsec-
tion reads: "The weight, the quantity, the volume, or dimensions of the goods." Dis-
tribuidora Dimsa, 976 F.2d at 96. The unofficial American translation, however, varies from
a strict translation of the French by adding a comma after "volume" and deleting the word
"the" before the word "dimensions."
63 See, e.g., Ronald Schmid, Legal Consequences of the Chan v. Korean Airlines Judgment for
Cargo Cases, 16 AIR L. 22, 24 (1991) (advocating a strictly conjunctive reading of subsection
(i)).
64 See, e.g., H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 311
(1954) (advocating a strictly disjunctive reading).
65 See, e.g., Distribuidora Dimsa, 976 F.2d at 97; Exim Indus., Inc. v. Pan Am. Airways,
Inc., 754 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1985) (adopting "commercially significant particular"
test).
66 See, e.g., Adelson, supra note 36, at 966 (noting U.S. dislike of the Convention);
Nobel, supra note 36, at 608 (discussing the difficult task that courts face in "interpreting
and enforcing the treaty's anachronistic provisions").
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edge that "a lot of the requirements in Art. 8 ... are of no practical
commercial significance for cargo handling in our days." '67 Given
the modem operations of air carriage, they contend, the documen-
tary requirements of Article 8 are "overly stringent" 68 and commer-
cially impracticable. 69
Several reform efforts have attempted to amend Article 8 in or-
der to correct its deficiencies. The Hague Protocol of 1955 deleted
all but three of the particulars required by the Convention. 70 Simi-
larly, the Montreal Protocols eliminated most of Article 8's require-
ments, greatly simplifying the documentary burden on carriers. 7'
The United States, however, has not ratified either of these agree-
ments. 72 Consequently, all shipments of cargo to and from Ameri-
can soil 73 continue to be governed by the waybill requirements of the
1929 Warsaw Convention.
67 See Schmid, supra note 63, at 24.
68 Dr. W. Miller-Rostin, The Incomplete Air Waybill, 16 AIR L. 280, 283 (1991).
69 See Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 917 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir.
1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the
framers of the Convention, had they envisioned the complexities of modem air transporta-
tion, "would have recognized the impracticability of listing all of the particulars" required
by Article 8); Muller-Rostin, supra note 68, at 283; Schmid, supra note 63, at 24.
70 Hague Protocol of 1955, supra note 43, art. VI. The three waybill requirements
under the Hague Protocol are: the places of departure and destination; the intermediate
stopping place, if the places of departure and destination are within the same country but
the intermediate stopping place is in another country; and notice that the Warsaw Conven-
tion governs the transportation. Id.
71 Montreal Protocol No. 4, supra note 50, art. III. The Montreal Protocol proposed
amending Article 8 of the Warsaw Convention so as to require only the following informa-
tion on the air waybill: the places of departure and destination; the intermediate stopping
place, if the places of the departure and destination are within the same country but the
intermediate stopping place is not; and the weight of the shipment. Id. More significantly,
under the Montreal Protocol, the omission of any of these three waybill requirements
would not automatically deprive the consignor of the Convention's limitation of liability
protections; rather, the consignor would only be liable for damages caused directly by "the
irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of the particulars and statements" on the air
waybill. Id.
72 Shmid, supra note 63, at 24. The majority of the Warsaw Convention's High Con-
tracting Parties have ratified the Hague Protocol, including Australia, Canada, France, Ja-
pan, and the United Kingdom. For a current listing of the High Contracting Parties to the
Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and the Montreal Protocols, see 138 CONG. REC.
S17843-02, S17846-47 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).
73 The applicability of the Convention to a cargo shipment depends on the air way-
bill. If the place of departure and of destination are both within countries that are mem-
bers of the Convention, then all flights between those two countries are subject to the
Convention. However, if either the place of departure or of destination is within a country
which does not participate in the Convention, then the Convention does not apply.
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 34, at 50 1. Accordingly, the Convention governs all
flights between the United States and other countries participating in the Convention.
Agreements, such as the Hague Protocol, not yet ratified by the United States have no
effect on these flights.
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III. Background Law
A. Judicial Interpretation of the Warsaw Convention Prior to Chan
v. Korean Air Lines
As discussed above, courts and commentators have expressed
their dissatisfaction with the Convention since its adoption by the
United States in 1932. 74 Finding the provisions of the Convention,
especially those concerning air carriers' limited liability for passen-
ger injuries, 7 5 to be inequitable and poorly drafted, judges took it
upon themselves to "revise" the document by interpreting its provi-
sions loosely. 76 Focusing their analyses on whether the purpose of
the Warsaw Convention was fulfilled in a case even though the literal
requirements of the treaty were not satisfied, these judges compen-
sated for the inability of the Executive and Legislative Branches to
modify and reform the outdated provisions of the Convention. 77
While this judicial revisionism was most evident in decisions
concerning personal injuries to passengers, judges also routinely
employed the "purpose-oriented" approach in air freight cases. 78
Unlike personal injury cases where courts were prone to interpret
the Convention in favor of the injured plaintiff, courts in air cargo
disputes tended to construe the Treaty in favor of the defendant-
carrier by limiting liability despite apparent non-compliance with Ar-
ticle 8. 79 Motivating this looser construction of the Warsaw Conven-
tion in air cargo cases was the assumption that the commercial
shippers bringing cargo claims had a stronger bargaining position
with air carriers and thus needed less protection against limited lia-
bility than the non-commercial passengers who brought most pas-
74 See supra Part I.
75 For analysis and criticism of the Warsaw Convention's regulation of passenger
claims, see Adelson, supra note 36, at 965-67; Ray B.Jeffrey, Comment, The Growth of Ameri-
can Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L. &
COM. 805 (1983).
76 See, e.g., Schmid, supra note 63, at 22 ("In the past we often learned that US [sic]
Courts do not hesitate to amend the plain wording of the Warsaw Convention through
self-willed interpretations in order to arrive at a result desired. The reason why some US
judges follow their own philosophical views is that they want to protect the carrier's oppos-
ing party to the air transportation contract (passenger or consignor) as the liability limita-
tions set out in the 1929 Convention are considered to be inadequate"); Adelson, supra
note 36, at 966 ("The United States has in the past expressed its dislike of the Warsaw
Convention .... Dissatisfaction with the Treaty, however, has not yet led to the kind of
legislative action that will meaningully protect passengers. Instead, protection came from
the courts which confined the Treaty to its purpose as best they could, hoping to avoid the
unfairness.").
77 For discussions of the "purpose-oriented" approach to judicial interpretation of
the Warsaw Convention, see Adelson, supra note 36, at 943-51; Noble, supra note 36, at
608-09.
78 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 36, at 865 ("Almost without exception, courts considering
Article 8 of the Warsaw Convention ... have attempted to determine whether the purpose
of the Warsaw Convention was fulfilled even absent strict compliance with the terms of the
Convention.").
79 Id.
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senger and baggage claims. 80
The liberal judicial construction of Article 8 is rooted in a series
of cases decided in the late 1940s and 1950s.8 1 These early decisions
involved Article 8(c), the subsection that requires the listing of
agreed stopping places on the air waybill. 82 In these cases, courts
focused not on whether the air carriers technically complied with the
exact text of the Convention, but rather on whether the carriers' acts
satisfied the purpose underlying Article 8's requirements. Since the
purpose of Article 8(c) was simply to give notice to the shipper of the
international nature of the carriage and of the applicability of the
Warsaw Convention to the flight, if a carrier's acts provided such no-
tice, then Article 8(c) was satisfied. For example, in Kraus v. Konin-
klihke Luchtvaart Maatschappy, N. V,83 a carrier's reference on its
waybill to its published timetable was found to satisfy Article 8(c)
because it provided the shipper with constructive notice of the inter-
national character of the shipment.84
Some courts construed Article 8(c) even more liberally than the
Kraus court. In Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. United States85 and American
Smelting & Refining Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. ,86 two carriers were
permitted to limit their liability even though their respective waybills
failed to indicate the agreed stopping places, either explicitly or by
reference to the carriers' published timetables. 87 Both decisions rea-
soned that, despite the explicit text of Article 8(c), the listing of the
places of departure and destination, which made the international
character of the flight apparent, satisfied the "stopping places"
requirement.88
When European tribunals later confronted similar disputes con-
cerning the interpretation of Article 8, they also adopted a "purpose-
oriented" approach in their interpretation of the Convention.8 9 In
80 Id.
81 Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 422, 145 Ct. Cl. 1 (Ct. Cl.
1959); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 141 N.Y.S.2d 818
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 900 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1956); Kraus v. Koninklihke
Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 92 N.Y.S.2d 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 105 N.Y.S.2d
351 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1951).
82 The text of Article 8(c) requires the air waybill to contain the "agreed stopping
places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case
of necessity .... Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(c), 49 Stat. at 3016.
83 92 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
84 Id. at 316.
85 170 F. Supp. 422 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
86 141 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 900 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1956).
87 Flying Tiger, 170 F. Supp. at 422; American Smelting, 141 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
88 Flying Tiger, 170 F. Supp. at 422; American Smelting, 141 N.Y.S.2d at 818; Kraus, 92
N.Y.S.2d at 315.
89 See Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, Inc., [1969] 1 Q.B. 616; Dico Handel-
en Industrie Mij. N.V. v. Garuda Indonesian Airways, P.N., No. 83 Schip en Schade 1970,
199 (Dist. Ct. Amsterdam, Oct. 29, 1969); Black Sea & Baltic General Ins. Co. Ltd. v.
Scandinavian Airlines System (Zurich High Ct., 2d Civ. Chamber (March 4, 1966)).
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Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, Inc. ,90 a British court was con-
fronted with the task of interpreting the ambiguous language of the
original French text of Article 8(i). 9 1 The British court applied a
practical construction of the Article "so as to make good sense
amongst commercial men."'92 Under this practical reading of the
Treaty, the court concluded that Article 8(i) did not require that the
waybill "state every particular, no matter how useless, or irrelevant.
It only requires those particulars to be stated so far as they are neces-
sary or useful for the purpose in hand." 93 The court thus held that
the listing of only one of the four particulars specified in Article
8(i)-the weight of the goods-satisfied the Convention's
requirements .94
The Corocraft opinion and its European brethren greatly influ-
enced the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Exim Industries, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,95 a case which best
reflects the "purpose-oriented" approach to interpreting Article 8 in
American jurisprudence. At issue was the extent of Pan Am's liabil-
ity for lost cargo belonging to Exim Industries.
Exim made two shipments of silk blouses to New York from In-
dia, which the contract carrier, Pan Am, lost the goods en route.96
Pan Am asserted that its liability for the lost cargo was limited under
the Warsaw Convention and that it only owed Exim $8,740. 97 In
response, Exim argued that Pan Am was not entitled to avail itself of
the Treaty's protection because of Pan Am's failure to comply with
the requirements of Article 8.98 Specifically, Exim contended that
the waybill for the first shipment omitted the method of packing and
marking of the cargo in violation of Article 8(h) and that the second
waybill failed to mention the volume or dimensions of the cargo as
required by Article 8(i).99
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that, despite the waybills' omissions, Pan Am was entitled to limit its
90 1 Q.B. at 616.
91 For the original text of Article 8(i), see supra note 62. The Court gave the original
French text priority over the British version of the Article, which was not ambiguously
worded. GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 102 (1977).
92 Miller-Rostin, supra note 68, at 282 (quoting Corocraft, 1 Q.B. at 616).
93 Corocraft, I Q.B. at 616.
94 Id.
95 754 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1985).
96 Id. at 107.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 108. Exim also contended that Pan Am violated Article 8(q), which requires
a statement that the Warsaw Convention governs the carriage, because the waybill merely
stated that the Convention "may" be applicable to the cargo transportation. Id. at 108.
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that the statement satisfied the pur-
pose of the requirement, which was to give the shipper "reasonable notice of the likeli-
hood that the Convention would be applicable." Id.
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liability under the Warsaw Convention.100 Noting the ambiguity of
the language of subsections (h) and (i), the court asserted that "only
those particulars having practical commercial significance with re-
spect to the shipment involved need be incorporated in the way-
bill."'' The court cited several foreign decisions, such as Corocraft,
that construed Article 8 similarly and emphasized that the United
States should adopt the same interpretation, in part, to "further the
desirable policy of uniformity" in treaty interpretation.10 2 The court
then concluded that the omissions in each of the waybills were of
little or no commercial significance since they were "technical and
insubstantial omissions that did not prejudice the shipper."' 03
B. The U.S. Supreme Court and Chan v. Korean Air Lines
The trend towards a "purpose-oriented" approach to judicial in-
terpretation of the Warsaw Convention ended in 1989 with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Chan v. Korean Air
Lines. 10 4 In Chan, family members of victims of an international air
disaster filed wrongful death actions against the carrier Korean Air
Lines for damages.10 5 Korean Air Lines claimed that it was entitled
to limited liability under the Warsaw Convention.' 0 6 The plaintiffs
protested, noting that Korean Air Lines failed to provide notice to its
passengers in the required type size of the carrier's limited liability
for personal injuries. 10 7 The plaintiffs, while conceding that the
Convention by itself imposed no specific sanction for such non-com-
pliance, argued that the Convention, read in conjunction with the
Montreal Agreement, operated to destroy the carrier's entitlement
under the Convention to limited liability. 10 8
100 Exim Industries v. Pan American World Airways, 754 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1985).
101 Id.
102 Id. (citing Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways, Inc., [1969] I QB. 616; Dico
Handel-en Industrie Mij. N.V. v. Garuda Indonesian Airways, P.N., No. 83 Schip en
Schade 1970, 199 (Dist. Ct. Amsterdam, Oct. 29, 1969); Black Sea & Baltic General Ins.
Co. Ltd. v. Scandinavian Airlines System (Zurich High Ct., 2d Civ. Chamber (March 4,
1966))).
103 Id. The "commercially insignificant omission" analysis applied in Exim has also
been used to interpret the Convention's documentary requirements in baggage claim
cases. See Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir.
1987).
104 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
105 Id. at 123. On September 1, 1983, a Soviet Union military aircraft shot down a
KAL airplane over the Sea of Japan. All 269 passengers on board died. The KAL flight
originated in New York and was headed to Seoul, South Korea. Id. Due to the interna-
tional character of the flight, it was governed by the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Agreement. Survivors of the passengers killed on the flight brought various suits against
KAL. These suits were consolidated for trial and transferred to the District Court for the
District of Columbia. All parties stipulated that the Warsaw Convention controlled the
action. Id. at 123-24.
106 Id. at 124.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 125-26.
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In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, 10 9 the Court ruled in
favor of the defendant Korean Air Lines, finding that the Conven-
tion, either read alone or in conjunction with the other agreement,
contained no sanction for printing the required notice in undersized
type.1 0 The Court's reasoning was two-fold. First, the Chan opinion
stated that the plain language of Article 3, which limits an air car-
rier's liability for personal injuries to passengers, did not contain any
penalty for non-compliance." 'I Stressing that the literal language of
the Treaty dictated its decision, the Court wrote: "[W]here the text is
clear ... we have no power to insert an amendment." ' "12
Second, the Court compared the limited liability provisions of
Article 3 to the liability protections offered by Articles 4, 8, and 9,
which limit a carrier's liability for lost cargo and baggage. 1 3 The
Court first acknowledged the similarity between the provisions, not-
ing that all the Articles refused to impose a limit on recovery when a
carrier failed to deliver the relevant document (a ticket, an air way-
bill, or a baggage check) to its customer." 14 The Court then distin-
guished the Convention's treatment of personal injury claims from
its treatment of baggage and cargo claims. The Court pointed out
that Article 3, unlike the other Articles, did not specifically mandate
the removal of an air carrier's limited liability for failing to record on
the document all of the particulars required by the text of the Con-
vention."15 This distinction, the Court deduced, indicated that the
Convention's drafters did not intend the delivery of a passenger
ticket with undersized typeface to deprive a carrier of limited
liability. 116
C. Post-Chan Decisions
Since the Chan decision, lower courts have generally followed
109 The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the Convention provided no sanction
for the typeface infraction; however, Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion concurring
in the judgment, in which Justices Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring). Unlike the majority opinion,
Justice Brennan found it appropriate to look at the drafting history of the Convention in
order to interpret Article 3. Id. at 136-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Justice
Brennan reached the same conclusion as his literalist counterpart Justice Scalia. Id. at 152
(Brennan, J., concurring).
110 Id. at 135.
III Id. at 128-29.
112 Id. at 134.
113 Id. at 131.
114 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 131 (1980).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 132-33. For further discussion of the Chan decision, see Richard Manuel
Clark, Note, Chan v. Korean Air Lines: The United States Supreme Court "Shoots Down" Notice
Requirements Under the Warsaw Convention, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 363 (1990); Larry Moore,
Note, Chan v. Korean Air Lines: The United States Supreme Court Eliminates the American Rule to
the Warsaw Convention, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 229 (1990); Schwartz, Note,
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.: Skirting the Legislative History of the Warsaw Convention, 11
Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 140 (1990).
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the Supreme Court's lead and adopted a strict construction of the
Warsaw Convention in passenger and baggage cases. In Buonocore v.
Trans World Airlines,l"7 for example, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declined to hold a carrier liable for the death of a passenger in
a terrorist attack in the public area of an airport terminal. Despite
the fact that the decedent had already checked in at the check-in
counter, presented his ticket and luggage, and received his boarding
pass, the court ruled that the carrier was not liable because the injury
to the passenger did not occur "in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking," as required by the literal text of the Warsaw
Convention. 1 8 Similarly, in Arkin v. New York Helicopter Co.,I1 9 the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court strictly con-
strued the Convention's documentary requirements for checked bag-
gage and held that an air carrier was subject to unlimited liability if it
omitted the weight and number of pieces on a passenger's baggage
check, as required by the text of the Convention.12 0
The strong language of the Chan decision in favor of a strict con-
struction of the Warsaw Convention, coupled with the literal inter-
pretation of the Treaty in subsequent passenger and baggage cases,
convinced most aviation law specialists that courts would strictly con-
strue Article 8 and its documentary requirements against air carriers
in future cargo cases.' 2 ' Some commentators, however, maintained
hope that courts would not apply Chan to air cargo claims. 122 The
reasoning of several of the post-Chan baggage cases buffeted these
hopes. The Arkin opinion, for example, distinguished between bag-
gage cases and cargo cases and indicated that a continued "purpose-
oriented approach" to the interpretation of Article 8 might still be
appropriate.123 Other baggage claim cases hinted that, while a strict
construction of the Convention was appropriate in a baggage claim
117 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990).
118 Id. at 9-10 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17).
1'9 544 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
120 Id. at 344-45 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 4). Other post-Chan
baggage cases that have strictly construed the Convention include Da Rosa v. Tap Air
Portugal, 796 F. Supp. 1508 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Hill v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 A.2d
1040 (N.J. Super. 1989). But see Lourenco v. Trans World Airlines, 581 A.2d 532 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990) (holding, without any mention of the Chan decision, that air-
line's failure to record required particulars on passenger's baggage claim check was techni-
cal and insubstantial and did not deny airline limited liability protection under the Warsaw
Convention).
121 See, e.g., Schmid, supra note 67, at 24 ("We are convinced that the US Supreme
Court would apply a similar plain meaning interpretation or literal approach to Article 8 as
in the Chan case. Whether or not the requirements are of any 'current practical commer-
cial significance' has to be ignored.").
122 See, e.g., Jonathan Barrett & Robert A. Lewis, Failure to Comply with Documentary
Techicalities of Warsaw Convention Leads to Unlimited Liability in Baggage Cases, 15 AIR L. 98, 99
(1990) ("It might be hoped that courts in the future will only interpret the convention
documentation requirements strictly against carriers in passenger cases.").
123 Arkin, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 344. See also Barrett & Lewis, supra note 122, at 99 (discuss-
ing the Arkin decision).
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brought by a non-commercial plaintiff, a less literal interpretation of
the Treaty might be warranted when the complainant is a commer-
cial entity. 124
The first case to address directly the impact of Chan on air cargo
carriage provided both proponents and detractors of the literal inter-
pretative approach with ammunition and encouragement. In Victoria
Sales Corporation v. Emery Air Freight,125 Victoria Sales sued Emery for
the loss of pharmaceuticals that Emery had agreed to ship from Am-
sterdam to New York. 126 Victoria Sales argued that it was entitled to
recover the full value of the lost goods because the carrier failed to
comply with the documentary requirements of Article 8 of the Con-
vention. 127 In turn, Emery argued, first, that the Warsaw Conven-
tion did not govern the case since the goods were not lost during
"transportation by air,"' 28 and second, that, even if the Convention
did apply, Emery was entitled to limit its liability under the
Convention. 12 9
The majority of the Victoria Sales court held for Emery, finding
that the Warsaw Convention did not govern the case. 130 Strictly con-
struing the Convention's definition of "transportation by air," the
court reasoned that "[t]he plain language of Article 8 draws the line
at the airport's border ... [and] excludes any transportation by land
outside of the airport."' 131 Since both parties agreed that the
pharmaceuticals were shipped successfully to New York and then lost
at the carrier's warehouse located just outside the boundaries of
Kennedy Airport, the Convention was inapplicable. 132 Although
Victoria Sales argued that "modern commercial realities" should
prompt the court to adopt a more expansive definition of what con-
124 See, e.g., Da Rosa v. Tap Air Portugal, 796 F. Supp. 1508, 1510 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(citing Vekris v. Peoples Express Airlines, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (finding
persuasive a line of cases distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial airline
passengers and literally construing Convention since case involved non-commercial
passenger).
125 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990).
126 Id. at 706.
127 Id. at 710-11 (Van Graafeiland,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(1). Section 1 of Article 18 holds carriers
liable for any damage to baggage or goods sustained during "transportation by air." Id.
Section 2 of Article 18 define "transportation by air" as
the period during which the baggage or goods are in charge of the carrier,
whether in an airport or on board an aircraft .... The period of the transportation
by air shall not extend to any transportation by land ... performed outside an airport.
If, however, such transportation takes place in the performance of a contract
for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery or transship-
ment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been
the result of an event which took place during the transportation by air.
Id. art. 18(2)-(3) (emphasis added).
129 Victoria Sales, 917 F.2d at 710-11 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
130 Id. at 706-07.
131 Id. at 707.
132 Id.
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stitutes an "airport" under Article 18, the court flatly rejected such
an interpretation.' 3 3 While acknowledging that a less literal inter-
pretation might be more "sensible,"'' 34 the court, citing Chan, stated
that "to engraft such an interpretation onto the plain language of
Article 18 would require an impermissible judicial amendment of the
Convention."' 135 Having found that the Convention did not govern
the case, the court did not address the second issue involving the
interpretation of Article 8 of the Convention.
Judge Van Graafeiland wrote a separate opinion to the Victoria
Sales decision. 136 Concurring in part and dissenting in part, his opin-
ion indicated that the "purpose-oriented approach" to the interpre-
tation of Article 8 would withstand the Chan decision. After first
resolving that, in his opinion, the Warsaw Convention did govern the
case,' 37 Judge Van Graafeiland then considered whether the failure
of Emery's waybill to note the markings on the lost package and its
volume and dimensions, as literally required by Article 8, precluded
the carrier from relying on the limitation of liability provisions of
Article 9. 138
Finding the facts of the case to be virtually identical to those in
the Exim decision, Judge Van Graafeiland defined the critical issue to
be whether the references to Article 8 in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Chan overturned the Second Circuit's holding in Exim. 139
Under his analysis, he found that Exim was still valid law.' 40 Dis-
missing the discussion of Article 8 in Chan as dictum, Judge Van
Graafeiland offered several reasons to support his opinion. Observ-
ing that the Chan decision did not address what omissions would
constitute a violation of Article 8, Judge Van Graafeiland first stated
that Chan "did not attempt to reverse the traditional canon of liberal
treaty construction that permits courts to go beyond the written
words and look to 'the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties.' "141 Second, he noted
that the Chan decision "had no occasion to consider the Conven-
133 Id.
134 Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, 917 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1990).
135 Id. (citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989)).
136 Id. at 709 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137 Id. at 710 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). judge
Van Graafeiland found that the damage to the cargo did occur during "transportation of
air" because the damage occurred, in his eyes, "in an airport," as required by Article 18.
Id. Noting that the term "airport" is not defined in the Warsaw Convention, he adopted a
"functional rather than 'metes and bounds' " definition of the term so as to "carry out the
general intent of the Convention's framers." Id.
138 Id. at 711 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139 Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, 917 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990) (Van
Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140 Id. (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Van
Graafeiland's approval of Exim was not surprising, considering his authorship of that
decision.
141 Id. (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Air
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tion's intended purpose of creating an international uniform law."'142
Generously citing the British court's decision in Corocraft,143 Judge
Van Graafeiland stressed that courts should strive to interpret the
Treaty in the same manner as other signatories to the Conven-
tion. 144 Finally, the modern conditions of air cargo transportation,
which rendered the listing of all the Article 8 particulars impractica-
ble, militated in favor of less literal and more practical reading of
subsections (h) and (i).145
While Judge Van Graafeiland's interpretation of Article 8 did
not command a majority in Victoria Sales, his appeal for the retention
of a practical, purpose-oriented interpretation of Article 8 was en-
dorsed in a subsequent Second Circuit decision, Distribuidora Dimsa
S.A. v. Linea Aerea Del Cobra S.A.. 146 In many respects, Distribuidora
Dimsa paralleled the Exim decision. Like Exim, the central issue of
Distribuidora Dimsa was whether the defendant air carrier was pre-
cluded from asserting the affirmative defense of limited liability
under the Warsaw Convention because it failed to record the method
of packing, the markings on the packages, the volume, and the
dimensions of the goods, in apparent violation of subsections (h) and
(i) of Article 8.147 The court addressed this issue with much the
same reasoning as the Exim decision, resolving that the omission of
"commercially insubstantial or insignificant and nonprejudicial" par-
ticulars on a waybill did not violate Article 8(h) or (i) so as to deny a
carrier limited liability. 148 Applying this standard, the Second Cir-
cuit found that the omission of the method of packing, the marks on
the packages, the volume, and the dimensions of the packages were
"commercially insubstantial" and "nonprejudicial."' 49 The court
accordingly held that the shipper's damages for the lost cargo were
limited to those allowed by the Convention.' 5"
IV. Analysis
The Second Circuit's decision in Maritime remains true to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Chan in two important respects. First, the
Maritime court read the Chan decision as a call not only for a strict
judicial construction of the Warsaw Convention's provisions pertain-
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United
States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943))).
142 Id. at 711-12 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
144 Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, 917 F.2d 705, 712-13 (2d Cir. 1990)
(Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145 Id. at 713 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146 976 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1992).
147 Id. at 93.
148 Id. at 97.
149 Id. at 97-98.
15o Id.
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ing to passenger claims, but also for a more literal reading of those
Articles governing international air cargo transportation. While
other courts had tried to restrict Chan's application only to passenger
and baggage claims, 15 1 the Maritime opinion correctly adhered to
Justice Scalia's admonition that "where the text [of a treaty] is clear
... [courts] have no power to insert an amendment ....",,152 Re-
maining true to the text of the Supreme Court's decision, the Second
Circuit adhered to precedent and followed Chan's commandment to
interpret literally all unambiguous provisions of the Convention, re-
gardless of whether the provisions pertain to passenger, baggage, or
cargo claims.
Second, the Maritime opinion properly applied the Chan ruling
by adopting a strict and literal construction of subdivisions (a), (c),
and (e) of Article 8 of the Warsaw Convention. As the Chan opinion
stated, strict construction of a provision of a treaty is mandated only
when the text of the provision is clear and unambiguous. 153 Thus,
the question that the Maritime bench had to answer was whether sub-
sections (a), (c), and (e) of Article 8 were drafted in a clear and un-
ambiguous manner. The court correctly concluded that these
provisions were unambiguous. Although certain provisions of the
Convention are riddled with infirmities, the clarity of Articles 8(a),
(c), and (e) has never been questioned. 154 Both the original French
version 155 and the American translation 56 of these subsections
151 See, e.g., Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 917 F.2d 705, 711-12 (2d
Cir. 1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding Justice
Scalia's discussion of Article 8 in Chan to be dictum, court held that Chan did not purport
to "reverse the traditional canon of liberal treaty construction"); Maritime Ins. Co. v. Em-
ery Air Freight Corp., 769 F. Supp. 126, 129-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 1993 WL 4963 at
*I No. 92-7672 (2d Cir. Jan 13, 1993) (district court found that Chan's call for a strict
construction of Warsaw Convention did not apply in cargo cases); Arkin v. New York Heli-
copter Corp., 544 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Lourenco v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 244 N.J. Super. 48, 581 A.2d 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
152 Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 134-135 (1989). Justice Scalia wrote:
We must ... be governed by the text [of the Treaty]-solemnly adopted by
the governments of many separate nations-whatever conclusions might be
drawn from the intricate drafting history [of the Convention] .... The latter
may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous [citation
omitted]. But where the text is clear . . .we have no power to insert an
amendment .... "[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any
clause, whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an
usurpation of power, and not an exercise ofjudicial functions. It would be to
make, and not to construe a treaty."
Id. (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 71, 5 L.Ed. 191 (1821)).
153 Id.
154 See, e.g., Miiler-Rostin, supra note 68, at 283 (stating that the language of Article
8 (c) is "clear and unequivocal"). No cases were found that questioned the clarity of sub-
sections (a) or (e).
155 The original French text of Article 8(a), (c), and (e) reads as follows:
La lettre de transport a6rien doit contenir les mentions suivantes:
(a) le lieu o6i le document a &6 cr66 et la date A laquelle il a &6 6tabli;
(c) les arr~ts pr6vus, sous r6serve de la facult6, pour le transporteur ...
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clearly and unambiguously require recordation on the waybill of the
place and date of the execution of the waybill, the agreed stopping
place for the shipment, and the name of the first carrier. The Mari-
time court's literal interpretation of these unambiguous provisions
displayed due respect for the Chan decision and the principle of stare
decisis.
Likewise, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also merits praise
for its distinction of Maritime from the decisions in Exim and Dis-
tribuidora Dimsa. Unlike subsections (a), (c), and (e) of Article 8, sub-
sections (h) and (i) of Article 8-the subsections at issue in both Exim
and Distribuidora Dimsa-are notoriously ambiguous provisions. 157
To infer that the Chan decision overruled the holding of Exim, as the
plaintiffs in Maritime argued unsuccessfully, would be to ignore the
recognized ambiguities of Articles 8(h) and (i). The Maritime court,
thus, properly affirmed the continuing yet limited validity of the Exim
and Distribuidora Dimsa decisions, acknowledging that courts should
look to the purpose underlying the Warsaw Convention's documen-
tary requirements to assist them only when construing provisions of
Article 8 that are truly ambiguous.
The strict construction of Article 8's documentary requirements
in Maritime raises questions about the continuing viability of past de-
cisions that employed a "purpose-oriented" interpretation of the Ar-
ticle. In particular jeopardy are the early cases that liberally
construed Article 8(c)'s "agreed stopping places" requirement. In
light of the Second Circuit's demand for strict, technical compliance
with Article 8, it appears unlikely that any court would excuse, as did
the courts in American & Refining Co. v. Philippine Air Lines 158 and Fly-
ing Tiger Line v. United States,159 a carrier's complete failure to make
any indication of the agreed stopping places on the air waybill. Such
a change would be welcomed by many aviation law specialists, who
have long criticized the liberal interpretations of the Convention in
these two cases.' 60 One must also question whether the decision in
(e) le nom et l'adresse du premier transporteur....
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(a), (c), (e), 49 Stat. at 3003, 137 L.N.T.S. at 18.
156 For the American translation of subsections (a), (c), and (e), see supra notes 60-61.
157 Articles 8(h) and (i) have been the subjects of much litigation, both in the United
States and abroad. See, e.g., Distribuidora Dimsa v. Linea Aerea Del Cobre S.A., 976 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that the "ambiguity in subsections (h) and (i) arises because the
text does not make clear whether the items listed in each subsection should be read con-
junctively or disjunctively ... [and because of] differences among the French original and
the British and American translations"); Exim Indus. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 754
F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1985); Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., [1969] 1 Q.B. 616.
158 141 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), afftd, 153 N.Y.S.2d 900-(N.Y. Ct. App.
1956). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
159 170 F. Supp. 411, 145 Ct. Cl. I (Ct. Cl. 1959). For a discussion of this decision, see
supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A
LEGAL HANDBOOK 41 (1988) (criticizing the decisions for completing disregarding Article 9
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Kraus v. Koninlihke Luchtvaart Maatschappj,16' which held that a way-
bill's reference to the carrier's timetable satisfied Article 8(c), could
withstand the scrutiny of Maritime's insistence on literal compliance
with Article 8.
Such uncertainties created by the Maritime decisions leave air
carriers in a precarious position. Cognizant of the dire conse-
quences for omitting any "commercially significant" particular listed
in subsections (h) and (i) or any of the other particulars required by
Article 8, carriers will be forced either to comply fully with these on-
erous documentary requirements or to invite unlimited liability for
the loss or damage to their cargo. Faced with such a choice, air carri-
ers most likely will choose the risk-averse alternative and comply
fully with Article 8, opting to pay the increased administrative costs
of compliance rather than run the gauntlet of unlimited liability.
The problem with requiring carriers to jump through the techni-
cal hoops of Article 8's documentary requirements in order to limit
their liability for lost or damage cargo is that such compliance is
commercially absurd in light of current conditions in the air carriage
industry. Judges and commentators alike acknowledge that the Con-
vention's waybill requirements are outdated and unnecessarily bur-
densome. 162 Such recognition led to the pared down versions of
Article 8 contained in the Hague Protocol and the Montreal Proto-
cols, both of which required only three particulars to be listed on the
waybill for a carrier to be entitled to limited liability. 163 Requiring
air carriers to comply with documentary requirements that are ac-
knowledged as unduly burdensome and to expend their limited re-
sources on such a fruitless endeavor makes no commercial sense.
Maritime, thus, illustrates that the Warsaw Convention, drafted
in a time when airplanes still had propellers,164 has outlived its pur-
pose. Many critics raise the fundamental question whether air carri-
ers, no longer in their infancy, should still be entitled to avail
themselves of the liability limits offered by the Warsaw Convention's
limited liability protections. 65 If not, these scholars believe that the
Convention should be scrapped in its entirety since it no longer
of the Convention); MILLER, supra note 91, at 101 (stating the "cases do not simply con-
strue Article 8(c) in a very liberal way. They disregard its terms .... ).
161 92 N.Y.S.2d 315, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 105 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1951). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
164 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 34, at 498 (describing the airline industry
circa 1929, when the Warsaw Convention was drafted).
165 See, e.g., Adelson, supra note 36, at 966 ("The aviation industry long ago outgrew
the need for special protection .... [L]imited liability on tort recovery is anathema to the
American ideal of full compensation to injured victims by those responsible for the harm.);
Jeffrey, supra note 75, at 805; In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp.
1463, 1470-71 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'dsub nom Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989) (criticizing the Warsaw Convention's liability limi-
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serves its original, or any other subsequent, purpose. 166 Even if one
concedes, however, that the Convention's limited liability scheme
should be retained, no sensible rationale explains why carriers must
satisfy the overly stringent documentary requirements of the Con-
vention in order to avail themselves of the Treaty's limitation of
liability.
V. Conclusion
The Maritime decision displays the irony inherent in many of the
recent cases interpreting the Warsaw Convention. While the deci-
sion displays sound judicial decisionmaking and respect for funda-
mental principles of treaty interpretation, its holding creates a
commercially nonsensical result by requiring air carriers to abide by
rules that are uniformly conceded to be superfluous, outdated, and
ambiguously drafted. 167 This irony is not lost upon the judges who
have been called to decide these air cargo cases and who have recog-
nized that the most "sensible" resolution of the case is not always the
result dictated by the letter of the Convention.168
One cannot blame the judges who decide cases such as Maritime
for the absurd consequences of their decisions; 169 rather, blame
should fall upon the United States' continued adherence to the es-
sentially unamended version of the 1929 Warsaw Convention. De-
spite previous calls for the United States to repudiate its
participation in the Convention, to ratify amendments to the Treaty,
or to negotiate a reformed version of the Convention, the United
States continues to bind itself to a treaty which has outworn its use-
fulness. The Maritime decision provides yet another illustration of
the Warsaw Convention's inadequacies and should put additional
pressure upon Washington to rethink American involvement in the
Warsaw Convention.
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tations as "anathema to traditional legal principles" and stating that "the air industry has
long since outgrown the need for special protection").
166 See sources cited supra note 75.
167 See supra Part II.
168 See, e.g. Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight, Inc., 917 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir.
1990) (acknowledging that a less literal interpretation of Convention might be more "sen-
sible" than a black letter reading of the Treaty's text).
169 See Noble, supra note 36, at 608-09.
684 [VOL. 18
